Battle of Long Tan - Overview
Battle of Long Tan is one of the most famous engagements in the Vietnam War, involving Australian and New Zealand forces against the North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong. It took place in a rubber plantation in Long Tan, Dat Do District, Ba Ria-Vung Tau Province (formerly known as Phuoc Tuy Province) Vietnam, on 18 August 1966.
This was the only time throughout the entire Vietnam war that the Australian Army engaged in a direct confrontation with the Viet Cong by themselves. Nowadays, it is commemorated annually on Long Tan Day, also known as Vietnam Veterans’ Day, on 18 August in Australia.
Belligerents
Australia, New Zealand, United States vs. Viet Cong, North Vietnam
Units involved
Units involved in Australian military force (108 troops):
- D Company, 6 RAR; Artillery support; multiple M113 and further infantry
- Royal Regiment of New Zealand Artillery
- 2/35th Artillery Battalion, Aerial Support from the United States
Units involved in Vietnam’s military force (700 troops – VC claim) (1500-2500 troops – AU claim):
- 5th Division
- 275th Regiment
- D445 Battalion
Casualties and losses
There were different statements about casualties and losses from both sides:
- Australia: 18 killed, 24 wounded
- Viet Cong/North Vietnam Claims:
- Australian Claim: 245 killed, 350 WIA, 3 captured
- VC/PAVN Sources: 50 killed, 100 wounded
Strategic location of Long Tan
Before going into details of the Battle of Long Tan, we will need to understand the significance of Ba Ria-Vung Tau province (formerly called Phuoc Tuy, where Long Tan belongs), the strategic calculations, and the historical context that shaped one of the war’s most intense encounters.
Positioned strategically near the sea route close to Saigon (which is the capital of the Republic of Vietnam at that time), Phuoc Tuy Province (Ba Ria – Vung Tau) was developed into a key defense area by the South Vietnamese government and its allies, including the US, Australia, and South Korea.
The area was mostly a rural area made up of farm fields and scrub lands. Though there are also some jungle areas, most of the 100,000 inhabitants (1966) of this province lived along the coastline areas and were known to be pro-Viet Cong or at least neutral, making the task of pacification more challenging and dangerous for the Australian forces and their allies.
They utilized existing French military installations to establish significant training facilities. Throughout the Vietnam War, it hosted the 1st Australian Logistics Support Group and various US military units, also becoming a favored R&R destination for US, Australian, and New Zealand forces.
Check the Long Tan Vietnam map below:
In this area, there was also a strategic location called Vung Tau Air Base. The United States used it as a base during the Vietnam War (1959–1975), stationing Army, Air Force, and Navy units there. It was also the main base supporting Australian operations in the war and Australian Army and Royal Australian Air Force units were based there.
When Phuoc Tuy (Ba Ria-Vung Tau), South Vietnam, was selected for the 1st Australian Task Force base, three locations were considered: Ba Ria, Vung Tau, and the central Long Tan – Nui Dat. Long Tan – Nui Dat, chosen for its strategic position, sat on Route 2, about 30 km from Vung Tau, offering isolation for independent operations while being near Viet Cong strongholds. This location’s strategic and somewhat isolated placement was ideal for the Australian forces’ counter-insurgency efforts, despite its proximity to a known Viet Cong presence.
Before the Battle of Long Tan (Viet Cong POV)
Every war comes with two different points of view. From this part of our article, we will see what happened on the Viet Cong’s side before the Battle of Long Tan.
In July 1966, the U.S. military transferred control and responsibility for pacification efforts in Phuoc Tuy Province (BR-VT) to Australian forces. The 1st Australian Task Force, consisting of 7,080 soldiers, including two infantry battalions, 13 special air service squads, and two artillery batteries, established bases at Nui Dat and Da Qui Mountain in Dat Do District. The Australian troops, experienced from counter-guerrilla warfare in Malaysia, utilized stealth, ambushes, and surprise attacks, maximizing the use of air and artillery firepower to inflict significant damage on revolutionary bases in the area.
In August 1966, the Southern Central Office decided to create the Long – Ba – Bien Province by merging three provinces: Long Khanh, Ba Ria, and Bien Hoa (including today’s Ba Ria-Vung Tau area), and reinforced this new province with the 5th Regiment of the 5th Division to work with local military and civilians to counter the Royal Australian Army’s operations.
The plans to attack the Australian forces by the Provincial Forces and the 5th Division were quickly prepared. On August 10, 1966, the command unit agreed on a plan to conduct an ambush, combining a frontal assault on the Australian troops in the Long Tan rubber plantation area.
According to the plan, the 5th Regiment and the 445th Provincial Battalion would set up a main ambush along a nearly 3km stretch of road within Route 52 in the Long Tan rubber plantation. The 2nd Battalion, the 5th Regiment, and the 2nd Company, 445th Battalion were reinforced with a B40 gun, a DKZ.57 gun, and a reconnaissance platoon tasked with blocking the front.
The 3rd Battalion was positioned to the northwest of Route 52 for a frontal breakthrough, while the 1st Battalion, reinforced with the 1st and 3rd Companies of the 445th Battalion, was positioned to the northeast of Route 52 to block the rear and coordinate with the 3rd Battalion in attacking the VC at the decisive battle location.
Before the Battle of Long Tan (Australian Army's POV)
08/06/1965: 1RAR arrived in Vietnam
HMAS (His Majesty’s Australian Ship) Sydney docks at Vung Tau, South Vietnam, transporting the majority of the Australian military contingent. Soldiers from the 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (1RAR), are seen unwinding on a Vietnamese Landing Craft in Vung Tau, South Vietnam, in anticipation of their short thirty-minute journey to land from HMAS Sydney.
This is the first complete Australian Army unit deployed to Vietnam. On 17/08/1965, the Australian Government sanctioned an expansion of its military presence in Vietnam. The enhancement includes elevating the force to a battalion group level, supplemented by artillery, extra armored personnel carriers (APCs), engineers, army helicopters, light aircraft, and increased logistical support.
01/03/1966: 1ATF arrived in Vietnam
In March and April 1966, the 5th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (5RAR), arrived in Vung Tau by both air and sea. At the time of arrival, the battalion lacked experience in coordinating with artillery for close support and conducting large-scale helicopter assaults. However, the American Army, particularly through the 68th Army Aviation Company, provided the necessary training to the battalion during its brief time in Vung Tau.
5RAR constituted one-half of the 1st Australian Task Force (1ATF), which also included the 6th Battalion (6RAR), the Special Air Service (SAS), the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), artillery units, armored personnel carriers (APCs), and support and logistics teams. The 1ATF took over from the 1st Battalion (1RAR) in Vietnam, establishing its base at Nui Dat in the Phuoc Tuy province.
24/05/1966: 5RAR moved to Long Tan - Nui Dat
The 5th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (5RAR) joined the U.S. 173rd Airborne Brigade to secure Nui Dat Hill and surrounding areas from the Viet Cong. The unit was deployed by helicopter.
06/06/1966: 6RAR arrived in Vietnam
On June 6, 1966, the 6th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (6RAR), reached Vung Tau, Vietnam, aboard the ‘Vung Tau Ferry’ (HMAS Sydney). Over the following five days, they underwent acclimatization at the Australian Logistics base in Vung Tau’s sand hills, concluding with a battalion-scale exercise on the final day.
14/06/1966: 6RAR rushed to Long Tan - Nui Dat
Amid rising intelligence reports suggesting VC movements towards the Long Tan – Nui Dat area, the base location for the Australian Task Force (ATF), the 6th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (6RAR), was swiftly airlifted by Chinook helicopters from Vung Tau to Nui Dat, arriving ahead of schedule. Upon their afternoon arrival at Nui Dat, the troops dedicated their time to digging defensive positions and clearing the surrounding area. Throughout the night, Delta Company was on high alert, maintaining a 100% stand-to posture. As they vigilantly watched, the rain poured down continuously.
Due to their arrival, the plan to build the Luscombe Airfield was about to start.
21/06/1966: Operation Enogerra
From 21/06 to 05/07/1966, 6RAR’s first operation, Enoggera. D Coy, 6RAR’s job was to complete the destruction of a village. They were to destroy or remove any caches of food and other supplies and then destroy the tunnels (also called Long Phuoc Tunels) and hides that honeycombed the area.
24/06/1966: Operation Hobart
The next mission undertaken by the 6th Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment (6RAR), was dubbed Operation Hobart. This operation aimed to conduct search and destroy missions against the Viet Cong, targeting the areas to the northeast and east of Long Tan, as well as to scour Long Tan itself for VC installations and hidden supplies. The battalion wrapped up its mission and returned to base on 29/07/1966.
Despite three days of extensive searching, no significant findings were reported. The outcome of Operation Hobart, like those before and after it, started to foster skepticism among the soldiers regarding the reliability of so-called ‘intelligence’ reports.
29/07/1966: Intel reports large Viet Cong Force nearby
Initial reports from Australian advisor Captain Mike Wells indicated the sighting of a Viet Cong battalion within the dense jungle of Line Alpha—a security perimeter extending 5km around the Australian Task Force (ATF) base, from which all civilian populations had been evacuated to simplify VC identification. Captain Wells and his team, working in conjunction with U.S. and South Vietnamese forces, were tasked with keeping abreast of allied strategies and operations, providing timely assessments and information to the ATF.
In response to these reports, two heavily armed Chinook helicopters were dispatched in the afternoon to attack the VC position. However, the ground fire was so intense that the pilots reported taking more fire than they could effectively return.
This led to an immediate call for an airstrike on the position. Subsequent intelligence suggested that 3,000 Viet Cong troops had congregated in Phuoc Tuy Province, posing a significant threat to allied forces. In response, Jackson sent Captain Robert Keep, the ATF Intelligence Officer, to the HQ II Field Force Vietnam (FFV) in Saigon with intelligence of a substantial VC force near Nui Dat. Despite requesting reinforcements, Keep’s appeals were nearly dismissed by American officials, who contrasted the request against the resources already in play and the intelligence they possessed.
Meanwhile, the 547 Signal Troop, Australia’s highly secretive radio tracking unit stationed at Nui Dat, began to monitor transmissions from the radio of the North Vietnamese Army’s 275 Regiment.
Given the rarity of radios among Viet Cong forces, typically found only at the regimental level, it was reasonable to infer the presence of the entire 275 Regiment (over 2,500 soldiers) alongside the detected radio. The 547 Signal Troop continued to trace this radio signal until August 14, pinpointing its last known location near the Nui Dat 2 feature on the outskirts of the Long Tan rubber plantation. In a twist of fate, this location would be where the first significant assault on the 11th Platoon, D Company, would originate on August 18.
30/07/1966: Patrol by D Coy 6RAR
Delta Company of the 6th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (6RAR) was dispatched for a reconnaissance mission towards the northeastern edge of Line Alpha, close to the Long Tan rubber plantation. Their objectives were to assess the level of VC presence and to find and eliminate any encampments.
On 15/08/1966, D Coy (6RAR) concluded their patrol without encountering the VC. Their route circled northeast, passing by the Nui Dat 2 feature, where the last Viet Cong radio transmissions were detected, and then led them back through the Long Tan rubber plantation and past the rubber tappers’ hut, yet they made no contact with VC forces.
16/08/1966: Intelligence officers gone
Previously, on 09/06/1966, Captain Robert Keep was dispatched to the 2nd Field Ambulance hospital in Vung Tau. Captain Keep had been the foremost advocate for the prediction of a significant VC assault on the Australian Task Force base at Nui Dat.
The Chief Intelligence Officer, Major John Rowe, was transported to the 2nd Field Ambulance hospital in Vung Tau due to Hepatitis. 1ATF HQ had now lost both its intelligence officers.
By a twist of fate, little did they know the Battle of Long Tan was coming.
Alpha Company of the 6th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (6RAR) took up the patrol path previously traversed by Delta Company, positioning themselves just north of the Long Tan rubber plantation and conducting their patrol southward across Nui Dat 2. During their patrol, Alpha Company encountered signs of the VC.
In the late afternoon, they engaged in several minor skirmishes with individuals clad in green uniforms (unlike the Viet Cong guerrillas, who typically wore black, it was the regular North Vietnamese Army (NVA) soldiers who donned green). In one of these confrontations, a Viet Cong officer was killed, and found to have documents related to mortar operations. Alpha Company set up their overnight camp in the area.
17/08/1966: A day before Long Tan Battle
2:43 AM - First strike
At 2:43 AM, North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces attacked the Australian Task Force base at Nui Dat. This attack wasn’t short or small. It lasted 22 minutes and left a clear mark: 67 holes from bombs in the ground. This surprise didn’t come without harm; 24 Australian soldiers were injured, with one injury so severe that the soldier lost a leg. Besides hurting people, the attack also damaged 7 vehicles and 21 tents. The attackers had a clear target in mind, focusing a lot on where the Australian soldiers controlled their artillery, the engineers’ area, and the command post.
2:50 AM - Payback
However, the Australian soldiers didn’t just sit back after this. They quickly responded with their own artillery and mortars, firing back at where they thought the attack came from. The attacks from Viet Cong quickly stopped.
4:50 AM to Midday - Searching
Lt Col Townsend, the leader of 6RAR, sent B Company out to find where the VC had fired on their base from. B Company found the first spot where the VC had set up a mortar. They spread out and discovered five spots for 82mm mortars and hiding spots for 35 soldiers. They also found tracks left by Viet Cong and followed them.
Now, 6RAR had three groups out looking for the VC near where they found the mortar setup and to the northeast of Nui Dat. A Company was searching 500 meters north of Nui Dat, 9 Platoon C Company was south of where they found the mortar, and B Company was in the middle. B Company was about 2 kilometers southwest of A Company and 1 kilometer northeast of 9 Platoon. With all these groups searching, it seemed unlikely any large number of VC soldiers could stay hidden. A Company also mentioned that the Viet Cong was strongly interfering with their radio messages.
18/08/1966: Battle of Long Tan
11:00 AM - D/6RAR took over B/6RAR
Delta Company of the 6th Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment, made up of three platoons (10th, 11th, and 12th), the Company Headquarters, and a three-man Forward Observation team from New Zealand’s 161 Battery (totaling 108 members), was dispatched to take over from B Company. Their mission was to keep looking for North Vietnamese Army and Viet Cong forces. Delta Company left the Nui Dat base right when a group of entertainers, including Col Joye and Little Pattie, were getting ready for a concert that everyone was looking forward to.
1:00 PM - Delta & Bravo companies meet-up
Delta and Bravo companies met up, and then B Company headed back to Nui Dat to attend the concert. Meanwhile, Delta Company, led by Major Harry Smith, along with his three platoons, the company headquarters group, and three artillery observers from New Zealand, ventured into the rubber plantation.
1:00 PM to 3:40 PM - The search continued
As B/6RAR headed back to the base, D/6RAR shook out and started to follow the cart tracks heading east. After 200 meters the cart tracks split, both still leading eastwards.
D/6RAR changed their formation:
- 10 Platoon to follow the north track
- 11 Platoon to follow the south track
When 11 Platoon (with 2 sections forward) reached the road, it started an obstacle drill. The two leading sections crossed the road and secured the other side, then Platoon HQ started to cross.
3:40 PM - Contact with Viet Cong
At 3:40 PM, there was a contact between D Coy and 6-8 Viet Cong soldiers in green (possibly wounding one). They killed one VC soldier and recovered an AK47.
Sergeant Bob Buick (11 Platoon – D/6RAR):
“Where 11 Platoon crossed, the track sloped slightly downhill to the north, our left, and the hill crested some 75 to 100 meters to the right. It was a gentle slope, limiting our visual distance to the south. When about ten meters from the fence I suddenly saw five or six VC, casually walking, with their heads down, along the track from the right. They had come over the rise just after the others in Platoon HQ had crossed the track and moved into the rubber. The VC had missed seeing them by a few seconds.
Without hesitation, I raised my rifle and fired two quick shots at a VC. He dropped as I had hit him with both rounds. The other VC took cover.”
Major Harry Smith – OC D/6RAR:
“The 11 Platoon Commander requested permission to give hot pursuit. I agreed – there were 5 or 6 VC, at least one of whom was at least wounded – a Platoon was well able to handle that task.
With 11 Platoon pushing ahead, I ordered 10 Platoon to maintain its direction and rate of advance. Company HQ and 12 Platoon would advance behind 10 Platoon.”
3:40 PM to 4:10 - The chase
The Viet Cong fled east, followed by 11 Platoon, as the Company closed up and followed at a slow pace. Clearing the hut, the 11 Platoon lost sight of the Viet Cong patrol but kept following the blood trail eastwards.
The Viet Cong fled east, followed by 11 Platoon, as the Company closed up and followed at a slow pace. Clearing the hut, the 11 Platoon lost sight of the Viet Cong patrol but kept following the blood trail eastwards.
Until the first contact, the Company had been in the older part of the rubber plantation. However, as 11 Platoon chased the small Viet Cong force, they and the Company moved to a younger plantation, similar to the photo below.
4:10 PM - 11 Platoon stopped by massive fire
At this stage, the Company was following the contact, so the tracks they had been following were forgotten. 11 Platoon continued the pursuit. At 4:10 PM, suddenly they were stopped by a massive fire from their left front (northeast).
As the Viet Cong launched a heavy attack, the 11th Platoon faced intense fire, forcing Delta Company of the 6th Battalion (6RAR) to move 100 meters north to regroup and counter the assault.
Meanwhile, at the 1st Australian Task Force base, life contrasted sharply with the front lines.
Two helicopters awaited departure for a post-concert trip back to Vung Tau, while some APCs were stationed at the base, either attending the concert or undergoing maintenance. After a three-day operation, Alpha Company of 6RAR returned to base, highlighting the stark difference between the frontline intensity and the relative calm at the base.
4:15 PM to 4:30 PM - Escalation and Response
At 4:15 PM, Smith informed his commanding officer, Colonel Townsend, about 11 Platoon’s engagement with a large Viet Cong force. Based on this information, Colonel Townsend ordered B/6RAR to hold position and prepare to support Delta Company, which was actively engaged in combat.
10 Platoon was deployed to assist in the defense of the company headquarters and support 11 Platoon’s withdrawal. During their movement, they encountered another VC formation, leading to further engagement.
Lieutenant Geoff Kendall from 10 Platoon described their advance towards the VC under heavy rain, with the intention of supporting 11 Platoon. He recounted the moments when they realized they were confronting an Viet Cong formation and not their comrades, leading to a firefight where they knocked down the VC on their right flank.
Major Harry Smith, commanding officer of Delta Company, recounted the evolving battle situation. He reported the initial VC contact and the growing scale of the engagement. Despite requests for additional manpower being denied, he secured approval for full artillery support, significantly increasing their firepower against the Viet Cong.
4:30 PM to 4:45 PM - Conflict at Nui Dat
At around 4:30 PM, 10 Platoon reported heavy machine gun fire from a hill. Initially, 11 Platoon had estimated facing a company-sized Viet Cong force. The situation escalated rapidly, with new estimates suggesting they were up against a battalion-sized Viet Cong force, conducting multiple assaults from the east.
Just before communications were lost with 10 Platoon, Private Bill ‘Yank’ Akell, a signaller from Delta Company, hurried from the company headquarters to 10 Platoon’s position to deliver a spare radio set. This move was crucial to maintain communication under intense Viet Cong fire.
By 4:45 PM, heavy rain had reduced visibility significantly across the battlefield, creating a knee-high mist from rain splashing on saturated soil, which added to the natural camouflage and complicated the combat conditions.
4:45 PM to 5:00 PM - Loss of Gordon Sharp
Around 4:50 PM, 11 Platoon’s Sergeant Bob Buick reported the tragic news that 2Lt Gordon Sharp, the officer commanding 11 Platoon, had been killed in action at the Battle of Long Tan. This loss came during a critical time of intense battle engagements.
Concurrently, as the battle raged, the Task Force base was a hive of activity. The helicopter crews were briefed about the ongoing situation and APCs along with Alpha Company of 6RAR were put on standby, ready to deploy to Long Tan to assist their comrades, indicating the rapid organization response to the battlefield needs.
5:00 PM to 5:10 PM - Communication Breakdown & Under Fire
Between 5:00 and 5:10 PM, the communication with 10 Platoon was completely lost just before a replacement radio could be delivered. Around the same time, 11 Platoon’s radio was damaged, losing its antenna, which disrupted their ability to coordinate artillery support, leading to a critical lapse in communication with the command headquarters.
In response to the communications loss, Commander Smith swiftly organized the Company Headquarters and 12 Platoon to move southeast towards 10 and 11 Platoons to support them. Once communication was restored, 10 Platoon reported they had sustained casualties and were in the process of withdrawing.
The rest of 12 Platoon was dispatched to aid 11 Platoon in their withdrawal while still under heavy fire from multiple directions. The VC was closing in from the north and east, with Viet Cong forces also visible to the south, pressing the platoons from three sides.
11 Platoon continued to face aggressive fire from the north and east, with Viet Cong troops now within 50 meters. Artillery was being called in approximately 100 meters from their position.
5:10 PM to 5:30 PM - Reinforcements and Supplies
11 Platoon was enduring intense pressure, watching Viet Cong forces encircle them to the south. After an hour of heavy engagement, they had suffered about 50% casualties and were critically low on ammunition.
At 5:10 PM, facing critical shortages and intensified VC pressure, Smith requested an urgent ammunition resupply to be airdropped by helicopter. He also called for an airstrike on Viet Cong positions to disrupt their depth operations and requested additional support from Bravo Company to reinforce their defensive efforts.
Back at the base, the situation was equally tense. Brigadier Jackson was concerned about over-concentration of forces and vehicle allocation.
The contacts between 12 and 10 Platoons quickly escalated as they faced probing attacks from the Viet Cong, who were assessing the limits and responses of the Australian defenses.
5:30 PM to 5:50 PM - Delayed support & danger close
At 5:30 PM, as US jets were dispatched to provide air support over Long Tan, helicopter crews raced to load and prepare ammunition for delivery to the frontline troops from the Task Force base to the 6RAR helipad. Despite their readiness, the final authorization to depart had not been granted, causing a delay in the critical resupply mission.
Between 5:30 and 5:40 PM, the situation for the Australian forces grew increasingly perilous as large groups of the VC began to flank their positions out of sight, aiming to encircle and isolate them further.
From 5:40 to 5:50 PM, as the VC found a strong point of resistance at 10 Platoon and consolidated their forces for a more coordinated attack, 11 Platoon’s position became untenable. Recognizing the gravity of their situation, Sergeant Buick prepared the surviving members of 11 Platoon for a potential withdrawal under increasing pressure from the Viet Cong.
Near 5:50 PM, US Air Force F-100 Super Sabre jets arrived over the battlefield in response to the urgent call for air support. However, due to thick cloud cover obscuring visibility, the pilots were unable to precisely locate 11 Platoon and their adversaries. As a result, they mistakenly dropped bombs and napalm a thousand meters further east of the intended target, missing the Viet Cong forces opposing 11 Platoon.
5:50 PM to 6:00 PM - Withdrawal & continuous attack
Under heavy artillery and small arms fire, the 11 Platoon swiftly retreated, evacuating all known wounded. However, amidst chaos, they had to leave behind 15 men.
The 12 Platoon remained engaged with VC patrols attempting to encircle and cut off the 11 Platoon’s retreat. Concurrently, the VC initiated several platoon-sized attacks from the east.
While ammo was being loaded onto helicopters, the Task Force awaited the go-ahead to move to Long Tan. Helicopters attempted to navigate through storm clouds, complicating the resupply mission. Meanwhile, VC forces tested the defenses with renewed attacks.
6:00 PM to 6:10 PM - Red smoke & supply
The VC attacked CHQ & 10 Platoon positions before regrouping as the firefight subsided. The first helicopter arrived near Delta Company’s location, marking its presence by deploying red smoke.
Communication mishaps occurred with helicopter support; the initial signal “Orange” was incorrect, followed by “Red” for the correct location, and the ammo was finally dropped at treetop height directly to the CSM. Post-ammo delivery, the pilots discussed their limited engagement due to the weather and the ongoing battle nearby.
After returning to the base, permission was finally granted for the APCs and A/6RAR to head to the battle site. Alpha Company boarded, and the APCs sped to their designated positions following the CO’s orders.
6:10 PM to 6:20 PM - Yellow smoke & intense fights
12 Platoon used a yellow smoke grenade to signal their position, attracting small groups of 6-10 VC. More VC were observed bypassing the area to the south, indicating continued enemy movements around their position.
10 Platoon observed VC assembling in a nearby rubber tree avenue, indicating preparation for a larger engagement. The VC, maintaining their encircling tactics, faced off against the known positions of CHQ and 10 Platoon.
A formation of VC advanced towards CHQ and 10 Platoon, leading to an immediate clash. This attack was met with resistance from 12 Platoon, highlighting the intense and dynamic battlefield engagements occurring within this period.
6:20 PM - APCs movement
APCs awaited opening a gap in the perimeter wire to proceed. Once opened, two carriers returned to CO 6RAR for orders while eight others sped through, deploying strategically to cross and protect the area. They crossed one by one. Meanwhile, CHQ and 10 Platoon faced multiple attacks from southeast and east by Viet Cong units, coinciding with Bravo Company’s arrival and APCs.
APCs made a perilous water crossing which is risky due to minimal clearance above water. The crossing occurred during a swift, swollen river condition under rainfall and impending darkness, heightening the risk of Viet Cong ambushes.
6:20 PM to 6:50 PM - The final defense
As the company established their final defense, the placement of sub-units remained unchanged. The main battle for the next 30 minutes focused on the northern to southwestern arc. During a brief lull, 12 Platoon and part of 11 Platoon regrouped at the company headquarters.
In the face of relentless VC assaults from all sides, the company held its ground amid the heaviest attacks. The use of artillery created a visual barrier, helping to repel VC advances. The intense battle led to a smoke-filled environment, complicating visibility and movements.
Following a strategic withdrawal by the 12 Platoon, the VC quickly probed the company’s southern edge with significant force. Company strength VC units launched coordinated assaults, testing the company’s eastern defenses.
Bravo Company advanced under heavy rain, navigating through difficult terrain with the support of APCs. The operation saw no direct confrontations with the VC during this phase, although their presence was substantial.
The battle intensified near the company’s position, with the VC attempting to infiltrate through the rubber plantation. APCs engaged the VC at close range, managing to inflict significant casualties without suffering any losses themselves.
6:50 PM to 7:00 PM - Last shot of Battle of Long Tan
Shortly after contact, three additional APCs joined the first group. Following orders from the CO of 6RAR, Roberts led them to pursue the retreating VC towards the east as darkness fell.
As darkness enveloped the rubber plantation, the sounds of the battle began to fade. B Company arrived on scene, their vehicle headlights piercing through the trees, putting an end to the Battle of Long Tan.
7:00 PM to dawn of 19/08 - Post-Battle Management
With no immediate Viet Cong threat, the entire force moved to the rubber plantation’s edge. Delta Company on APCs formed a defensive square and initiated “Operation Smithfield” at midnight to manage the aftermath, including casualty evacuation.
Helicopters were called in to evacuate casualties. Bravo and Alpha Companies secured the evacuation site. Delta Company’s “Operation Vendetta” transitioned to “Operation Smithfield,” focusing on following up on retreating Viet Cong forces.
Memorial and Rebuilding
Three years later, in 1969, the men of the same battalion felt a strong need to mark the site of such significant sacrifice and brotherhood. Long Tan Cross was placed at the site where their comrades had fallen, serving as a memorial to honor their courage and memory.
Read a detailed article about Long Tan Cross:
Long Tan Cross – Story & visitor guide
On 18 August 1971, 20th Prime Minister of Australia, William McMahon, announced Australia and New Zealand – the United States and Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) allies – would withdraw their troops from Vietnam. After the Australian Army left the Phước Tuy Province, the Army of the Republic of Vietnam was unable to maintain control and the Viet Cong eventually would take over the village and territories that had been held so long by the Australians.
After the Battle of Long Tan, many veterans remained profoundly affected by their experiences. Recognizing the ongoing needs of Vietnam, Paul Murphy, a veteran himself, founded the Australia Vietnam Volunteers Resource Group (AVVRG) in 1994. This organization focuses on providing humanitarian aid and has carried out numerous projects, including educational and health services.
The AVVRG began by rebuilding the Hoa Long Primary School, starting the Long Phuoc Kindergarten, and expanded to support various other initiatives, helping to make a significant impact in the local communities.
More articles about Battle of Long Tan:
List of Australian soldiers who died in Battle of Long Tan
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